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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
BANK OF SALT LAKE, a Utah
corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

CORPORATION OF THE
PRESIDENT OF THE CHURCH
OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTERDAY SAINTS, a Utah
corporation sole,
Defendant-Appellant.

Case No.
13704

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
SUPPLEMENTARY STATEMENT OF FACTS
The following supplementary facts are set forth to
assist the Court with the argument which follows.
There are four loan transactions relevant to this
case. The timing of these transactions is best described by
reference to Appendix A. For each loan transaction, the
date of the assignment, as shown on the assignment instrument is given in the first column, the date of the
making of the note as shown on the face of the note is
1
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

given in the second, the date of the letter from the Bank to
Leland Bruderer, as typed at the top of the letter, is given
in the third, and the date opposite the signature of Bruderer at the bottom of the letter is given in the fourth column. The trial exhibit number evidencing the loan transaction is given in the final column.
In each of these cases the assignments were not made
until after the letter, intended as a notice of assignment,
had been returned. The assignment relating to loan # 1 is
undated. However, the note was made on August 14, 1968,
one day after the letter was made and the Bruderer signature obtained. As for loan # 2 , the letter and the assignment
bear the same date. For loan # 3 , the assignment is undated. However, the letter was made on March 7 and
signed by Bruderer on March 16, while the note itself was
not made until March 17. The assignment itself shows
that the assignment was made after the making of the
March 7 letter since the assignment refers to "invoices as
listed in letter of March 7, 1969 . . . ." The assignment
relating to loan # 4 was made on March 26, 1969, while
the letter was dated five days earlier, March 21. At the
time that Cook took the letters to Bruderer for each of
the four loan transactions, no assignment instrument nor
other supporting documents were attached to the letter
(R. 50-52). The reason that no supporting documents
were attached is that none had been made at the time the
letters were given to Bruderer. The testimony reveals
that the loans were conditioned upon the obtaining of an
"acknowledgment" (R. 21). The testimony of Mr. Norton
Parker, the President of the Bank of Salt Lake, shows that

3
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

for at least some of the loan transactions the Bank of Salt
Lake had not yet extended credit nor received assignments
of the proceeds of invoices before making representations
to the contrary in the letters given to Bruderer. (R. 168).
Appendices B through E summarize the assignments,
letters and invoices involved in the loan transactions.
In several places in the Respondent's Brief, it is
stated that Bruderer executed the assignments in these
transactions (Respondent's Brief 17, 20). It is obvious that
Mr. Bruderer did not make any assignments.
With respect to Aldon Cook's dealings with the Bank,
the Bank typed Bruderer's name on the form letters upon
the recommendation of Cook (R. 47). Cook gave Bruderer's name to the Bank because he felt Bruderer would
sign the letters (R. 47). Cook believed Bruderer was his
best friend within the Church (R. 47). Paul West, the
Assistant Vice-President of the Bank, delivered the prepared letters to Cook with directions to take them to
Bruderer (R. 48).
Bruderer is not the only person with whom Aldon
Cook had contact on behalf of The Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints (Church). Bruderer was just part
of the total picture. Cook dealt with the Purchasing
Department as well (R. 9, 64). The invoices sent to
the Church also show that Cook was dealing with an
entity other than Institutes and Seminaries. Most of the
invoices show the purchaser to be the L.D.S. Building
Department.

3
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When Cook took the letters to Bruderer for his signature he, Cook, explained that he needed help in getting a
loan from the Bank (R. 104). Bruderer made it clear at
that point, and Cook understood, that Bruderer had no
authority to acknowledge any assignments on behalf of
the Church. (R. 43, 44, 104). After Bruderer explained to
Cook that he had no authority to sign the acknowledgment or direct payment by check to the Bank of Salt Lake,
Cook told Bruderer that he would see that all invoices
would have the name of the Bank of Salt Lake on them
(R. 104). It was upon this understanding that Bruderer
signed the letters.
Regarding the October 19, 1969, letter from the Bank
to Bruderer, Bruderer called Cook immediately after receiving the letter because Cook was the only person from
the Bank that Bruderer had ever worked with regarding
the transaction. He was informed by Cook that the letter
was written in error and that Cook would call the Bank
(R. 108).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
BRUDERER HAD NO APPARENT AUTHORITY TO ACKNOWLEDGE INDEBTEDNESS
OR AGREE TO ASSIGNMENTS OF ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE ON BEHALF OF THE
DEFENDANT
In its initial brief, the Appellant has set forth its
argument that Bruderer had neither actual nor apparent
authority to act in behalf of the Defendant-Appellant,

4
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

However, Respondent in Point II of his brief, makes
the argument that Bruderer did have apparent authority
to acknowledge indebtedness or to agree to assignments
for the benefit of the Defendant. Although the argument
heading states that Bruderer had apparent authority to
receive the notice of assignment, the argument is extended
to the point of contending that he had apparent authority
to acknowledge corporate indebtedness and agree to
assignments on behalf of the Defendant.
It is true, as the Respondent states, that a corporation
is bound by the acts of its officers and agents acting within
the apparent scope of their authority. However, the Respondent fails to mention the equally important agency
principle that a person dealing with an agent must use
reasonable diligence and prudence to ascertain whether
the agent acts within the scope of his powers, and is therefore presumed to know the extent of the agent's authority.
19 Am. Jur. 2d Corporations § 1165 at 592 (1965).
The real question as to Bruderer's apparent authority
to transact business for the Defendant is whether the Defendant has held Bruderer out or permitted him to act for
the Defendant in such a way as to justify a third person
dealing with him to assume that he is going an act within
the scope of his authority. An agent may not by his own
actions establish his scope of authority.
The question is9 then, what has the Defendant done
to make it appear that Bruderer is an agent for the Defendant for the purpose of acknowledging corporate debts
or agreeing to assignments? At no time prior to the in5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

stant loan transactions had Bruderer ever acknowledged
corporate indebtedness or agreed to assignments on behalf of the Defendant. There is no past pattern of these
activities that would indicate to Cook or to the Plaintiff
Bank that Bruderer had any authority to accomplish these
objectives. Neither had he at any time communicated with
anyone regarding the form in which the checks were to be
paid. Bruderer's duties were for the most part limited to internal clerical functions of the Institutes and Seminaries,
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints (Church).
His sole nonclerical function was recommending various
types or brands of school furniture and fixtures for, and
estimating the aggregate costs of furnishing any given
room in, a specific seminary or institute. He had no control over pricing or returning defective merchandise.
Neither did he issue requisition forms to the Purchasing
or Building Departments of the Church, although he did
prepare the requisitions in proper form for approval and
signature by his immediate supervisor. While he believed
that his recommendations were generally approved, he
had no way of controlling whether any particular requisition was approved or rejected or whether any resulting
invoice was a valid one.
The Defendant did nothing to hold Bruderer out as a
person to contact regarding acknowledgment of corporate
debts or assignments, or having checks made payable in a
certain manner. Nor did the Defendant allow Bruderer
to carry on any activities that would lead one to believe
that he had any authority to do these things. Therefore,
it follows that he had no apparent authority to conduct
any of these matters for the Defendant. Any appearances

6
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received by the Plaintiff Bank were not those generated
by the Defendant. Cook, on behalf of the Plaintiff Bank,
knew that Bruderer had no such authority. If it appeared
to Paul West, Assistant Vice-President of the Bank, that
Bruderer had such authority, such an appearance was
generated by Cook himself and not the Defendant.
The cases cited by the Respondent, Harrison v. Auto
Securities Corp., 70 Utah 11, 257 P. 677 (1927) and Santi
v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R., 21 Utah 2d 157,442 P.2d
921 (1968), both involved apparent authority but are both
distinguishable from this case. The Harrison case involved the purchase by a widow of a used car from a Mr.
Clark in Price. The widow did not know that Clark had
no actual authority to sell the car, it having been given to
Clark from the Graham Company for the purpose of exhibiting it only. The court, noting that there was some
sort of agency agreement between Clark and the Graham
Company that had not been entered into the record and
that previously Clark's company had purchased other cars
from the Graham Company for resale at Price, held that
Clark had apparent authority to sell the automobile to
the widow. Unlike the instant case, in Harrison, the
Graham Company, by its actions of selling outright other
automobiles to Clark's company, gave the appearance to
third parties that Clark had the actual authority to sell
that particular automobile. The Graham Company, therefore was estopped from complaining that the particular
automobile sold by Clark was not in his possession for
resale.

7
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Furthermore, the Harrison court concluded that when
one of two innocent parties must suffer from the wrongful act of a third person, the loss should fall on the one
that allowed the third party to perpetrate the wrong.
The Respondent states that if the Defendant and the Bank
be considered two innocent parties, then the Defendant,
being the party that allowed the wrong to be committed,
should be the party to bear the loss. However, the Plaintiff Bank fails to realize that its conduct was an even
greater contributing factor in allowing the transaction to
proceed than the Defendant. Here we have an Assistant
Vice-President of a bank allowing a potential debtor to
designate the person upon whom notice of the assignments should be given. Without making even a cursory
examination of Bruderer's authority, he has a letter typed
and addressed to Bruderer informing him of the intended
assignment and requesting his acknowledgment at the
bottom. To complicate matters, he does not send he letter
through the normal channels of the U.S. mail, but allows
Cook, the person making the designation in the first place,
to hand-deliver the letter to Bruderer and obtain his signature largely on the basis of assurances that Cook will see
that the Plaintiff Bank is satisfied. The point is that
the Plaintiff Bank, by allowing Cook virtually to
take over the transaction for the Plaintiff Bank, shirked
its responsibilities of verifying the authority of the person
receiving the letter and of seeing that no slight of hand was
performed by Cook. These acts by the Plaintiff Bank can
be contrasted with those of Bruderer, a low-level employee, of signing a letter for a business acquaintance to help
him get a loan when he was assured by him that he

*

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

would handle all the arrangements. Clearly, it was the
Plaintiff Bank's acts of allowing Cook to designate Bruderer that allowed the loss to occur.
The Santi case similarly does not help the Respondent.
In Santi, the plaintiff made a bid to purchase freightdamaged merchandise from a railroad company. The
plaintiff gave his offer to a railroad agent at the scene
who relayed the offer by direct line to the railroad's home
office. The plaintiff stated that the railroad agent later
informed him that the company had accepted his offer,
although the company denied accepting the offer.
The plaintiff knew that the agent had no authority of his
own to accept the offers without company approval. The
railroad company itself did nothing to induce the plaintiff
to believe that it had accepted the offer. Hence, the court
held that the agent had no apparent authority to accept
an offer. Similarly, since the Defendant did nothing to
induce the Plaintiff Bank to believe Bruderer had any
authority to receive notices of assignments, acknowledge
corporate indebtedness, or agree to the method of payment of any assignment, Bruderer had no such apparent
authority.
The Respondent concludes that the Defendant is
estopped to deny the apparent authority with which it
allegedly clothed Bruderer. It is seen, however, that
Bruderer had no apparent authority to conduct the particular transactions involved for the Defendant, nor did
he have actual authority to do so. As such, the estoppel
principle is not applicable and the Defendant has every
right to deny that Bruderer acted in its behalf in "acknowledging* ' the assignments.

9
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The Respondent makes several incorrect statements at
the close of his argument in Point II concerning the authority of Bruderer (Respondent's Brief 17-20)). The evidence
shows that Bruderer was not responsible for the requisitioning and ordering of furnishings and equipment for all
seminaries and institutes within the Church during 1968
and 1969. It is not true that he dealt with Kerry-Aldon
Associates for the purpose of obtaining various items of
furniture and equipment nor is it true that any transaction with Kerry-Aldon was consumated in Bruderer's
office. It is not true that he in fact ordered certain
items from Kerry-Aldon Associates in order to furnish
seminary and institute buildings. It is not true that the
Church placed Bruderer in a position of authority with
the Seminaries and Institutes Division and authorized
him to order and requisition office furnishings and equipment. It is not true that Bruderer had apparent authority
to execute acknowledgments of assignments on behalf of
the Church. Neither is it true that Bruderer made no mention of any lack of authority to the Plaintiff Bank or anyone else. The evidence makes it clear that the only person
representing the Plaintiff Bank to contact Bruderer was
Cook, who brought the letter of the Plaintiff Bank to
Bruderer, who in turn told Cook he had no authority to
receive or sign such a letter.
Further, the Plaintiff Bank cannot categorize itself as
an innocent third party deceived by the alleged apparent
authority of Bruderer. The Plaintiff Bank, unlike the
widow in Harrison, supra, did not act in good faith. In
this situation where notice to the debtor is crucial, "good
faith" ordinarily includes (1) the absence of any actual

w
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knowledge that would indicate that a manner of giving
notice would not be effective, and (2) the use of means
of communication that are commercially reasonable.
1 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201:82 at
115 (2d ed. 1970). It is submitted that allowing Cook to
hand-deliver the letter to a person he himself designated
was not a commercially reasonable means of communication, especially considering the high standard of care
and caution required of sophisticated lending institutions.

POINT

II

COOK HAD ACTUAL A N D APPARENT
AUTHORITY FROM PLAINTIFF TO TAKE
THE NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT A N D RECEIVE AN ACKNOWLEDGMENT THEREOF,
A N D COOKS KNOWLEDGE THAT BRUDERER HAD NO AUTHORITY TO ACKNOWLEDGE THE ASSIGNMENT SHOULD BE IMPUTED TO THE PLAINTIFF BANK
The Plaintiff Bank claims that Bruderer made no
mention of his lack of authority to the Plaintiff Bank or
anyone else over a three month period (Respondent's Brief
at 20). In fact, Bruderer did mention the lack of authority
to Cook, the only person from the Bank he had dealt
with in the transaction. Cook's knowledge of this should
be imputed to the Plaintiff Bank.
Usually the assignee of accounts receivable has the
duty of notifying the account debtor that the account has
II
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been assigned and that payments should be made directly
to the assignee. The Plaintiff Bank delegated that duty
to Cook. By doing so, the Plaintiff Bank made Cook its
agent for the purpose of delivering the notice of assignment and receiving a corporate acknowledgment from a
person in the organization having proper authority. Cook
had actual authority from the Bank to perform these functions.
Further, he had apparent authority to do these things
since he brought with him in his dealings with Bruderer,
letters bearing the letterhead of the Plaintiff Bank of Salt
Lake and the signature of its Assistant Vice-President,
Paul West. Third persons dealing with Cook would thus
obtain the correct impression that he had authority from
the Plaintiff Bank to conduct that particular transaction.
In the course of the very transaction that Cook was
apparently and actually authorized to carry out, Cook received direct knowledge from Bruderer that he, Bruderer,
was not the proper party to handle the transaction:
I explained to Mr. Cook at the time when he
first made the contact that I did not have authority
to sign for the Corporation of the President and to
have checks made out to the bank. . . .
(R. 104, 1. 21-24). As such, the Plaintiff Bank had notice
that Bruderer had no authority in the transaction. It is a
well settled rule

-

"that notice to an agent of facts arising from, or
connected with, the subject-matter of the agency
is constructive notice to the principle, when the

m
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,

notice comes to the agent while he is concerned
for the principle {sic.}, and in the course of the
very transaction."
-H
*^ >

Renton v. Monnier, 11 Cal. 449, 19 P. 820, 822 (1888).
In specific application, it is well-established that the
knowledge of an agent of a bank, whether he is president,
cashier or some other person, is knowledge of the bank
that he represents in the transaction performed by him
within the scope of his authority. 3 Fletcher, Private Corporations § 806.1 at 55 (rev. vol. 1965).
Therefore, the Plaintiff Bank had knowledge that
Bruderer had no authority to acknowledge the assignment and have checks made payable to the Plaintiff Bank.
As such, the Plaintiff Bank should be estopped from
claiming that Bruderer had either actual or apparent
authority to do such things.

POINT HI
THE FOUR LETTERS RECEIVED BY BRUDERER DO NOT EVEN CONSTITUTE NOTICES OF ASSIGNMENTS SINCE THEY
WERE MADE BEFORE THE RESPECTIVE
ASSIGNMENTS WERE MADE
In Respondent's brief the case of Time Finance Corporation v. Johnson Trucking Co., 23 Utah 2d 115, 458
P.2d 873 (1969), is extensively cited in support of its
argument. That case is clearly distinguishable respecting
those points urged by the Respondent, and an analysis of
that decision is supportive of Defendant's position, in that
the Time Finance court stated by way of instruction to

13
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the trial court that notice of intended assignment, given
before an assignment is actually made, is not notice of the
assignment whatsoever.
Since the Respondent's statement of facts in the
Time Finance case is somewhat inaccurate, a detailed
analysis will be beneficial.
Johnson Trucking Company, through its agent, Maxwell, approached Time Finance Corporation in order to
obtain a loan. Maxwell informed it that he would soon
receive the insurance proceeds from a wrecked truck. Before Time Finance would loan the money with the insurance proceeds as collateral, Time Finance requested that
Maxwell obtain a letter from Mang, a general agent of
Occidental, stating that Time's name would be put on the
checks from Occidental. Maxwell went to Mang and
stated that he needed a letter in order to borrow money.
Mang wrote a letter to Time Finance stating that he adjustment of the claim was pending at that time and that,
in any event, Time Finance would be shown as the loss
payee on any claim draft. All of this was done before an
assignment had been made. Upon receiving the letter
from Mang, Time Finance loaned the money to Maxwell
upon a collateral assignment of the insurance proceeds.
The receipt of such a letter by Time Finance was clearly
a condition precedent to the loan and the assignment. The
Court states that there is nothing in the record to indicate
that Time Finance subsequently notified Occidental of the
assignment of the insurance proceeds.
The Court describes the requirements of a notice of
assignment:

14
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Maxwell contacted Mang for the purpose of
procuring a letter to Time Finance prior to the
loan transaction. Time Finance, after the execution of the assignment by Maxwell, did not give
notice to either Mang or Occidental.
A notice of intended assignment is not notice
of a subsequent assignment. * *
# * * b u t a n assignee, in order to protect
himself, cannot remain silent. * * * But in order
to protect his rights, the assignee must notify the
debtor of the assignment, since the latter is entitled
to setoffs and defenses he may have or may acquire
against the assignor, until he is notified of the
assignment. * * .
23 Utah 2d at 119, 458 P.2d at 875-76.
The similarity of facts of the Time Finance case and
the present case is striking. Kerry-Aldon, Inc., through
Aldon Cook, approached the Plaintiff Bank of Salt Lake
for the purpose of borrowing money. As collateral, KerryAldon, Inc. was willing to put up the proceeds of invoices that it expected to receive soon. The Plaintiff Bank
requested that Cook acquire a written acknowledgment
from the Church stating that the Bank's name would be
put on the checks issued in payment of the invoices. Cook
went to Bruderer and stated that he needed the acknowledgment signed in order to borrow money. It appears
that obtaining a signed acknowledgment from the Church
was a condition precedent to the loan and assignment
transaction:
Q (By Mr. Kipp) And isn't it true, Mr. Cook,
that you told Mr. Bruderer on each occasion you
needed to have these acknowledgement of assignments in order to get your money?
A

That is true.
15
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Q You advised him that was a condition of your
loaning procedure with the Bank?
A

He understood that.

R. 34, 1. 3-9. The evidence also shows that at the
time Bruderer signed the letters, no assignment or loan
had actually been made:
Q Mr. Parker, referring to "Exhibit 2-P-C,"
which is a letter dated August 13, 1968, your testimony, I assume, would be that contrary to the
statement indicated in the first paragraph of that
letter, that Kerry-Aldon Associates did not — that
the Bank of Salt Lake did not extend credit to
Kerry-Aldon Associates as so indicated in the letter?
A

Correct.

Q And also is it not correct — Also it is correct
contrary to the representations in the letter that
the bank, that Karry-Aldon {sic] Associates had
not assigned the proceeds of their invoices as written on the letter?
A

Correct.

R. 168, 1. 8-19. As in the Time Finance case, there
is no evidence in the record to indicate that the
Plaintiff Bank ever notified the Defendant or Church of
the assignment after the assignment had been made. See
Appendix A. Assuming for argument that the Bank had
given notification concerning an assignment that it intended to take, it never notified the Church or Defendant
that an assignment had actually been made.
Therefore, even if the notices were to be considered
as received by the Defendant or the Church, they were not
proper notices of assignments, as no assignments had yet
16
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been made. The reason for requiring the assignee to be
precise and exact in his notice to the account debtor is
found in the history of assignments:
The substitution of a new creditor is in derogation
of the rights of the debtor, and was strictly prohibited by the ancient rules of the common law. It
is only by relaxation of those rules, in deference
to the convenience of trade, that such assignments
have been recognized at all . . . .
Skobis v. Verge, 102 Wis. 122, 78 N.W. 426, 428 (1899).
Williston, as quoted in Time Finance, further elaborates
on the requirements and reasons for exactness in giving
notices of assignment:
"The fact, however, of such substitution of a
new creditor must, in order to make the debtor
liable to the assignee, be brought home to the debtor with much exactness and certainty before he
has paid the debt. The rule of notice to him is
much more stringent than that which may defeat
the title of a purchaser of a chose in action or of
real estate. The latter is free to purchase or refuse
to purchase as he chooses, and therefore it is his
duty, before acting, to trace out any reasonable
doubt and to inform himself of the true facts as
soon as anything arises to put him on inquiry. But
the debtor is not so situated. He must pay to his
original creditor when the debt is due, unless he
can establish affirmatively that someone else has a
better right. The notice to him, therefore, must be
of so exact and specific a character as to convince
him that he is no longer liable to such original
creditor, and to place in his hands the means of
defense against him, or at least the information
necessary to interplead the assignee."
23 Utah 2d at 120, 458 P.2d at 876-77.

17
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The Respondent attempts to use the Time Finance
case to show that knowledge received by Bruderer should
be imputed to the Church just as knowledge to Mang, the
general agent for Occidental was imputed to Occidental.
With regards to this contention, Time Finance can be
distinguished in two ways. First, Mang was a general insurance agent for Occidental who doubtless had authority
to receive notices of transactions involving all aspects of
the insurance business. Bruderer, on the other hand, had
only very limited responsibility in a specific division of
one department of the Church. It was not part of his duty
to process notices of assignments or to see that checks were
made payable to a particular payee. Mang undoubtedly
was responsible for processing these types of transactions.
Not all knowledge received by an agent is constructive
notice to the principal. It is only when the notice comes
to the agent while he is concerned for the principal and in
the course of the very transaction over which he had
authority that knowledge of the agent is constructive notice to the principal. Renton v. Monnier, 77 Cal. 449, 19
P. 820, 822 (1888). In the Renton case, the court held
that notice to an architect employed by the defendant
that a building contractor, who was working on a building
over which the architect had charge, had assigned his
right of payment to another party did not arise from nor
was connected with the subject-matter of the agency of
the architect and hence, the defendant was not on notice of
the assignment. Similarly, Bruderer did not have authority
to receive notices of assignments nor to have checks made
payable to certain payees. Neither did he have general
authority for the Church or Defendant. Therefore, neither
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the Church nor Defendant should be held to be on constructive notice that an assignment had been made.
Second, the effectiveness of the receipt of a notice by
an organization should be determined in light of the definitions of the Uniform Commercial Code. The liability
to an assignee is governed by section 70A-9-318(3) of the
Utah Code. Whether a debtor is obligated to make payments to a subsequent assignee depends upon whether
the assignee has notified the debtor in such a way that
reasonably identifies the rights assigned.
POINT IV
EVEN IF THE LETTERS RECEIVED BY
BRUDERER CONSTITUTE NOTICES OF
ASSIGNMENT, THE NOTICES WERE NEVER
RECEIVED BY THE DEFENDANT, AS NOTICE TO AN ORGANIZATION IS DEFINED
BY THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
The Uniform Commercial Code continues in effect
the prior law that an account debtor is authori2ed to pay
the assignor until the account debtor receives notification
(that reasonably identifies the rights assigned) that the
account has been assigned and that payment is to be made
to the assignee. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318(3) (1968).
In the absence of such a reasonably identified notice of
assignment, the account debtor may continue to pay the
assignor. See Taubenhaus v. Jung Factors, Inc., 478
S.W.2d 149, 152 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
The date that a notice is effectively received by an
organization is defined by the UCC:
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Notice, knowledge or a notice or notification
received by an organization is effective for a particular transaction from the time when it is brought
to the attention of the individual conducting that
transaction, and in any event from the time when
it would have been brought to his attention if the
organization had exercised due diligence. An organization exercises due diligence if it maintains
reasonable routines for communicating significant
information to the person conducting the transaction and there is reasonable compliance with
the routines. Due diligence does not require an
individual acting for the organization to communicate information unless such communication is part
of his regular duties or unless he has reason to
know of the transaction and that the transaction
would be materially affected by the information.
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-1-20K27) (1968) (emphasis added).
The crucial question in applying this section of the
UCC and the agency principles already discussed is the
meaning of the word "transaction." Identifying the "transaction' ' in this particular situation is facilitated by determining the purpose for the notice. The purpose of a
notice of assignment is to inform the account debtor that
he is now legally responsible to pay his debt directly to the
assignee, unless he is informed otherwise in the notice.
He must see that all payments on the debt are made
directly to the assignee. Since the account debtor
is not involved in the assignment itself, its only part in
the "transaction" is to see that the checks it issues are made
payable to the assignee. The "transaction" in this case
then, was making the Plaintiff Bank a payee on checks
issued. This was the concern of the Bank and the precise
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reason that it sent the notice to Bruderer via Cook in the
first place.
The definition states that the notice is effective when
it is brought to the attention of the individual conducting
that transaction. Because the "transaction" in this case
consisted of having checks issued with the Bank as a
joint payee, Bruderer clearly was not the person conducting that transaction. The individual conducting that
transaction would have been an officer of the Defendant
authorized to conduct its financial affairs. Even if the
"transaction" were considered to have been the various
sales indicated on the invoices, Bruderer was still not the
person conducting the transaction because he did not
have the authority to issue purchase orders nor enter into
purchase contracts. He was limited to making recommendations as to what manufacturers' lines should be
purchased and had no knowledge whether any particular
invoice represented a valid debt owed by the Church.
While higher-level employees of the Seminary and Institutes Division often requisitioned furnishings, the purchase orders were issued by the Church Purchasing Department. The Kerry-Aldon, Inc. invoices themselves usually show the purchaser to be the Church Building Department.
The word "transaction" certainly cannot refer to the
receipt of notice, as Respondent contends, because any person that receives the notice would automatically become
the person conducting the "transaction," thereby making
notice effective when it is served on any person in the organization, clearly not the intent of the UCC.

tl
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Because the notice was not received by the proper
financial officer of the Defendant, the notice would only
be effective from the time when it would have been
brought to his attention had "due diligence" been exercised. The final sentence of the definition states that due
diligence does not require an employee of an organization to communicate information given to him unless one
of the following is true: (1) such communication is part of
his regular duties or (2) he has reason to know of the
transaction and he has reason to know that the transaction would be materially affected by the information.
Anderson discusses this aspect of due diligence as approached from the individual's obligation:
Under the standard of due diligence, the organization's personnel are not required to volunteer information merely because they know of it. Only
in two types of cases does due diligence require
that an individual acting for the organization communicate information which is significant in its relationship to a given transaction: the duty to communicate known information exists if it is a part
of such person's regular duties to communicate
the information in question or he has reason to
know of the transaction and that it would be
materially affected by the information.
1 Anderson, Uniform
120 (2d ed. 1970).

Commercial

Code § 1-201:87 at

Was it part of Bruderer's regular duty to communicate with the financial officer of the Defendant or anyone else regarding notices of assignments? Clearly not.
Bruderer's responsibilities, for the most part, were cen-
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tered around the internal operations of the institutes and
seminaries. It was never his responsibility to communicate such information to the financial officer of the Defendant, whose office was not even in the same building.
If Bruderer did not communicate information as part
of his regular duties, did he have reason to "know of the
transaction?" When he received the letters from Cook
and saw that various invoice numbers were listed in the
letters, he did not know whether those were valid invoices that the Church had an obligation to pay. He had
no reason to know whether the Church had purchased any
particular items of furnishings from Kerry-Aldon because he only recommended but did not have authority
to actually order the furnishings. Hence, he did not really
"know of the transaction."
However, even if it is considered that Bruderer had
reason to "know of the transaction" he did not have reason
to know "that the transaction would be materially affected
by the information." In fact, he had reason to believe
that the transaction would not be materially affected by
the information because Cook, carrying a letter from the
Bank and bearing the apparent authority to conduct the
transaction, informed Bruderer that he would make sure
that all invoices bore the name of the Bank of Salt Lake
(R. 104).
In other words, Bruderer was told by an agent of the
Bank that it would not be necessary for him to do any
more regarding the transaction, but that the Bank would
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see that it received its payments. Thus, Bruderer relied on
the representations of Cook.
,
Therefore, "due diligence" did not require Bruderer
to communicate this information with anyone else. The
consequence of this is stated by Anderson:
If there is no duty on the part of the employee to
communicate, it is apparent that the reasonable
time, at the expiration of which the person in
charge of the transaction is to be charged with notice or knowledge, did not begin to run when that
employee received the notice or acquired the knowledge.
1 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § 1-201:87 at
119-20 (2d ed. 1970). Hence, unless the individual conducting the transaction receives the notice independent of
communication from the person receiving that notice who
has no duty to communicate it, the organization never
effectively receives the notice. Such is the case here. Anderson explains:
By inference, the Code provides that the notice or knowledge is not effective when received
or acquired by the agent or employee and expressly
declares that it is effective from the time when the
person conducting the transaction to which the
notice or knowledge relates learns of such notice
or acquires such knowledge . . . .
1 Anderson, Uniform Commercial
117-18 (2d ed. 1970).

Code § 1-201:86 at

The Respondent incorrectly states that section 70A-1201 (26) (b) of the Utah Code indicates that notices delivered to Mr. Bruderer's office are the same as notices
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received by the Church. The import of that section is that
if a notice is delivered to an office where a particular contract was made or an office held out by a person as a
place for receipt of such communications, then that person effectively receives notice. In other words, if Bruderer
had not been in his office when Cook arrived with the
letter, and Cook left the letter at Bruderer's office, this
section of the Code would say that Bruderer effectively
has received the notice. It does not say that the Church
or Defendant has effectively received the notice. Whether
the Defendant has received such a notice depends upon
other law previously argued.
The Respondent also cites several cases dealing with
notice to an organization. Each of these cases is distinguishable. Cooper v. Holder, 21 Utah 2d 40,440 P.2d 15 (1968),
is not governed by the UCC since the assignment took
place in 1961, before enactment of the UCC in Utah.
Further, the mayor of a city is not in the same position as
Bruderer, since the mayor is the chief executive officer of
the city and is affirmatively charged by statute with the
duty of giving the council information relative to the
business of the city. In Ertel v. RCA, 307 N.E.2d 471 (Ind.
1974), the written notice of assignment was sent by certified mail and received by a dock employee as evidenced
by his signature. The mail was normally delivered to the
receiving dock and dock employees were authorized to
sign receipts for certified mail. Therefore, it was the dock
employee's regular duty to communicate the notice. In
Gateway National Bank v. Saxe, Bacon and Bolan, 40
App. Div. 2d 653, 336 N.Y.S.2d 668 (1972), the partner
receiving the notice was the senior partner of the de-
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fendant law firm. He was also the chairman of the board
of directors for the plaintiff. H e forwarded to the plaintiff bank, for signature, on the defendant's stationery,
a UCC financing statement covering the assignment.
Bruderer is certainly not in the position of this senior
law partner. Similarly, Boulevard National Bank v. Gulf
American Land Corp., 179 So. 2d 584, 586 (Fla. App.
1965), is not applicable. In Boulevard, liability was based
upon the acknowledgment of the assignment by an
assistant treasurer of the defendant. Bruderer has no
similar authority to acknowledge assignments on behalf
of the Church or Defendant.
The Respondent also lists from Fletcher types of employees to whom notice was given which bound the corporation. Suffice it to say that an examination of the cases
involving these employees shows that the information received by them was directly apropos to their regular duties.
With like ease Fletcher can be quoted in support of the
appellant:
On the other hand, in particular cases, notice
to or knowledge of the following persons was
held not imputable to the corporation . . . janitor
of depot, . . . timekeeper and shipping clerk,
though styled "chief clerk," . . . .
3 W. Fletcher, Private Corporations § 807 at 65-66 (rev.
vol.1965).
POINT V
THE DEFENDANT CANNOT BE LIABLE O N
THE BASIS OF THE GENERAL ASSIGNMENT OF ACCOUNTS BECAUSE I T RECEIVED N O NOTICE OF SUCH A N ASSIGNMENT
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Subsequent to the four loan transactions discussed
above, the Bank obtained a general assignment of
accounts from Kerry-Aldon, Inc., upon which a UCC
filing was made. Neither the Defendant, the Church,
nor any agent or employee of either was ever given notice
of the general assignment.
It is the Respondent's position that the general filing
with the Secretary of State is adequate notice to bind an
account debtor to make payments to the assignee. Such a
position is absurd. Certainly it is true that such a filing is
sufficient to protect the Bank as against subsequent
assignees. However, in order to bind the account debtor,
he must receive actual notice that reasonably identifies
the rights being assigned. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318
(3) (1968). If a general UCC filing were adequate to make
the account debtor liable to the assignee, then no consumer
would be safe in paying his gas or electric bill until he
check the UCC filings with the Secretary of State to see
whether the utility companies had assigned the proceeds of their accounts receivable. Such a contention deserves no further comment.
POINT VI
IN ANY EVENT, THE DEFENDANT'S LIABILITY ON THE ASSIGNMENT OF INVOICE NO. 1171 SHOULD BE NO GREATER THAN THE FACE AMOUNT OF THAT
INVOICE
The Respondent, after asserting in its brief that
acknowledgment of an assignment is not necessary in
order to bind a debtor and that notice to the debtor is
27
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sufficient, reverts to the argument re invoice 1171 that
Bruderer, on behalf of the Defendant, acknowledged the
indebtedness for the full amount of $34,966. However, as
mentioned previously, Bruderer had no actual or apparent
authority to acknowledge any indebtedness on behalf of
the Church or Defendant.
For loan no. 4, the letter to Bruderer states that
Kerry-Aldon Associates had assigned the proceeds of invoice no. 1171 in the amount of $34,966. In fact, the
assignment makes no mention of invoice no. 1171 and is
signed by Aldon Cook in his individual capacity. Invoice
no. 1171 was a blank form in Cook's office at the time
of the loan transaction and, in fact, was later filled in
in the amount of $85.00.
Even if it is held that the Defendant had notice of
this assignment, it should not be responsible for paying
$34,966 to the Bank on the basis of the letter of notification from the Bank. The letter states that the proceeds
of invoice no. 1171 had been assigned. In searching for
that invoice, it would have been found that it was only
for an amount of $85.00. The Defendant should have no
further liability than to pay the $85.00 to the Bank.
As mentioned previously, great exactness and preciseness is required in notices of assignments. The Defendant should not have been put in a position of paying
more than it was obligated to pay directly to the Bank,
because the assignor might have claimed that only $85.00
should have been paid directly to the Bank. It is unfair
to put the Defendant in such a position and it was mani-
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fest upon the Bank to specify with preciseness what proceeds were being assigned. As stated in the UCC: A notification which does not reasonably identify the rights
assigned is ineffective. Utah Code Ann. § 70A-9-318
(3) (1968).
Other arguments regarding invoice 1171 and the
Defendant's contention that it has no liability in respect
thereto, are set forth in the initial brief of the Defendant.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons heretofore argued in the Brief and
Reply Brief of the Defendant-Appellant, the judgment
of the lower court in favor of the Plaintiff-Respondent
should be reversed, and the Defendant-Appellant should
be awarded judgment and its costs.
Respectfully submitted,
RAYMOND W. GEE
J. DOUGLAS MITCHELL
DAVID A. WESTERBY
of and for
KIRTON, McCONKIE,
BOYER & BOYLE
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for DefendantAppellant
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APPENDIX A
Timing Sequences of Loan Transactions

Assignment

Note

Letter3

Signature4

Exhibit

Loan # l i

Undated

Aug. 14, 1969

Aug. 13,1968

Aug. 13,1968

2-P

Loan # 2

Jan. 15, 1969

Jan. 15,1969

Jan. 15,1969

Jan. 15,1969

3-P

Loan # 3

Undated 2

Mar. 17, 1969

Mar. 7,1969

Mar. 16,1969

5-P

Loan # 4

Mar. 26,1969

Mar. 26,1969

Mar. 21,1969

Mar. 26,1969

4-P

L

This loan was paid by involuntary offset.
Explicit reference is made in the assignment to the March 7, 1969, letter, showing
that the assignment was made after the letter.
5
Letters from Bank to Leland Bruderer — date at top of letter.
1
Date opposite signature of Leland Bruderer at the bottom of letter.
* From trial court records.
2
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APPENDIX B
The Collateral

Collateral Per Assignment
Instrument1

Collateral Per Letter2

Note
Secured

Loan # 1

"Invoices to LDS Church Department of Seminaries and
Institutes Totaling $18,978.36"

"Proceeds of their
totaling $18,978.36"

invoices

$14,280
r

Loan # 2

"Payment of Invoice numbers: 1076, 1038, 1034, 1026,
1089, 1041, 1043, 1032, 1040,
1031, 1049, 1047, 1103, 1097,
1104, 1105, 1107, and 1115 to
the LDS Church"

"Proceeds of their invoices # ' s
1076, 1038, 1034, 1026, 1089,
1041, 1043, 1032, 1040, 1031,
1049, 1047, 1103, 1097, 1104,
1105, 1107, and 1115, totaling
$14,047.76"

$17,200

Loan # 3

"Invoices as Listed in Letter
of March 7, 1969 to L.D.S.
Church.
Invoice #1091 to Weber
State College"

"Proceeds of their invoices # ' s
1106, 1114, 1036, 1137, 1122,
1146, 1147, 1148, 1149, 1150,
1151, 1152, 1153, 1154, 1114,
1146, 1122, and 1165 for a total
amount of $10,192.04"

$14,000

Loan # 4

"Invoice from Seminaries &
Institutes, of L.D.S. Church"

"Proceeds of invoice #1171 in
the amount of $34,966"

$24,450

1

As shown on the assignment instrument

2

As shown on the letter from the Bank to Leland Bruderer
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APPENDIX C
Invoice Data For Loan # 2
Invoice
#
1076

Invoice
Date

Purchaser

$2,265.55

Nov. 25,1968

LDS Church
Building Dept.

3-P-P

Exhibit

1038

$

45.00

Oct. 10,1968

LDS Church
Building Dept.

3-P-L

1034

$ 379.00

Oct. 10, 1968

LDS Church
Building Dept.

3-P-J

1026

$ 711.00

Oct. 10, 1968

LDS Church
Building Dept.

Jan. 21,1969

3-P-G

1089

$

32.60

Dec. 16, 1968

LDS Church
Building Dept.

Jan. 15,1969

3-P-Q

1041

$

31.00

Oct. 10, 1968

LDS Church
Building Dept.

Jan. 21,1969

3-P-N

No
evidence

1043
1032

$ 356.00

Oct. 10,1968

LDS Church
Building Dept.

1040

$ 332.50

Oct. 10, 1968

LDS Church
Building Dept.

Jan. 21,1969

3-P-M

1031

$ 387.25

Oct. 10,1968

LDS Church
Building Dept.

Jan. 15,1969

3-P-H

1049

$

35.00

Oct. 10,1968

LDS Church
Building Dept.

3-P-O

1047

$2,947.24

Oct. 10,1968

LDS Church
Building Dept.

(Cook
4 Depo.)

1097

3-P-I

No
evidence

1103

1

Date of i
Check

Amount

$ 896.00

Jan. 6, 1969

LDS Church
Building Dept.

1104

No
evidence

1105

No
evidence

1107

^No
evidence

1115

No
evidence

(Cook
4 Depo.)

Included only when check dated before the letter was received by Bruderer (Jan. 15,
1969), or within one week thereafter. Source—Exhibit 24-D.

NOTE: Invoice #1036 is included in exhibit 3-P-K but is not included in the assignment nor the letter. Amount — $455.40.
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APPENDIX D
Invoice Data For Loan # 3
[nvoice
#
1106

Amount

Invoice
Date

Purchaser

Date of 2
Check

Exhibit

Mar. 7,1L969

5-P-Q

No
evidence *

1114

No
evidence x

1036

$ 455.40

Oct. 10, 1968

LDS Church
Building Dept.

1137

$ 221.64

Feb. 14, 1969

1122

$

32.00

Feb. 5,1969

1146

$

43.50

Mar. 3,1969

"Sevier
School
& Office
Supply"
Ch. of Jesus
Christ of
Latter-day
Saints
"San
Bernadino
District
Seminaries"

1147

$ 551.25

Mar. 7, 1969

1148

$

43.50

Mar. 3,1969

1149

$

63.50

Mar. 7,1969

LDS Church
Building Dept.

5-P-K

1150

$ 702.00

Mar. 7,1969

LDS Church
Building Dept.

5-P-J

1151

$ 160.00

Mar. 7,1969

1152

$1,907.00

Mar. 7, 1969

1153

$1,036.00

Mar. 7,1969

1154

$

Mar. 7,1969

79.50

5-P-P

5-P-O

5-P-N

LDS Church
Building Dept.

5-P-M
Mar. 13, 1969

Mar. 13, 1969
Church
Building Dept.

25-D

25-D
5-P-H
25-D

Mar. 13, 1969

1114*

duplicate

1146*

duplicate

1122*

duplicate

1165

No evidence 1

1

25-D

There are some unidentifiable invoices in evidence that may relate to these numbers.
Included only when check dated before the letter was received by Bruderer (Mar. 16,
1969).
Source: Exhibit 24-D
15
N O T E : The duplications are as listed in the letter.
2
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APPENDIX E
Invoice Data For Loan # 4

Invoice
#

Amount

Invoice
Date

1171

$85.00

Apr. 17,1969

Purchaser

Exhibit

L.D.S.
School Div.

22-D
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APPENDIX F

Invoices Upon Which Evidence Was Entered and That Were Paid
Than One Week After Bruderer Received The Letter

Loan # 2
Loan # 3
Loan # 4

$ 6,932.79
4,335.25
85.00

Total

$11,353.04
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